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The Decline of the Cattle-contract in Rwanda:
A Cause and a Symptom of Conflict
The conflict in Rwanda from
beginning in the middle of the twentieth
century, and that which culminated in the
death of nearly a million individuals in the
spring of 1994 is commonly understood
to be the result of tensions between two
tribal groups. However by examining
social structure in Rwanda prior to
Belgian rule, the situation becomes
infinitely more complex and revealing. It
was not the case that Hutu and Tutsi were
separate societies, rather social structure in
Rwanda was the frame for a network of
reciprocal relationships. This social
structure secured the Tutsi monopoly on
social and political power, meanwhile
providing that those with less wealth and
power might still obtain access to them
through association with those who had it.
So, barring a lengthy discussion of Belgian
complicity in the present conflict, the
result of the unequal distribution of
powers displaced from their ideational
contexts provides an interesting case for
an anthropologist interested in identifying
the functional aspects of social structure.
By clarifying the details surrounding the
cattle-contract in Rwanda, as well as the
social structure in which this is made
possible, it comes to light that the decline
of this social form is simultaneously a
cause and a symptom of the tension
between Tutsi and Hutu, and that the
conflict cannot be viewed as a case of
tribal warfare, but rather as a product of
the dysfunction between two castes in a
single society.
In Lemarchand's analysis of the
"mythical axis" of Rwandan society, he
identifies three recurring themes that are
key in understanding Rwandan culture
prior to colonization - the first being that
the caste structure was divinely ordained
(1970). Bronislaw Malinowski believed
that "myth possesses the normative power
of fixing custom, of sanctioning modes of
behaviour, of giving dignity and
importance to an institution" (1961
[1922]:328). This perspective suggests that
the myth of origins of the Tutsi, Hutu and
Twa castes in Rwanda can be viewed as a
sort of moral foundation for the social
hierarchy evinced in Rwanda.
The history of Rwanda begins
with the reign of Kigwa, who descended
from heaven and sired three sons - Gatwa,
Gahutu and Gatutsi. To choose his
sucessor, Kigwa decided to entrust each
of his sons with a pot of milk to watch
over during the night. When dawn came it
turned out that Gatwa had drunk the milk;
Gahutu had gone to sleep and spilt his
milk; only the watchful Gatutsi had stayed
up through the night to keep guard over
his milk. To Kigwa this was the conclusive
evidence that Gatutsi should be his
successor and forever free of menial tasks.
(Lemarchand 1970:33)
This is an example of the
simultaneously integrative and divisive
nature of Rwandan culture prior to
Belgian colonization. Though each group
is separate and plays a relatively different
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social role and function, each has a place
and is linked by a divine origin in a
mythical past. The rich cattle-herding
Tutsi, who also survived on agricultural
goods provided by Hutu, were at the most
exalted position in the hierarchy, followed
by the Hutu horticulturalists who raised
the cattle belonging to Tutsi, and at the
bottom of the social hierarchy, and
essentially a social pariah in the
perspective of the Tutsi and perhaps also
of the Hutu, were the Twa. These caste
divisions could be generally distinguished
by economic activity, however these
groups were also viewed as having
phenotypic or "racial" differences. In fact,
however, these differences have been now
denounced as having been representative
more of the imagined than of actual
biological differences. These groups were
marked with a slight degree of social
mobility,as a poor Tutsi could come to be
considered as Hutu, a rich Hutu could
possibly slip into being a Tutsi, and their
descendants as well would come to be
distinguished as such (Maybury-Lewis
1997).
Bound to the notion of divinely
ordained castes, and second in
Lemarchand's themes in Rwandan myth,
was that of royal omnipotence wherein
the mwami, or king, incarnated the deity
Imana (1970). Accordingly, "the mwami,
representative of Imana, was the father
and protector of all Ruanda.... [and he]
certainly contributed to the creation in
Ruanda individuals of a feeling of
belonging to a unit which presented some
similarities to a family" (Maquet
1961:151).This belief in the mwami was
not limited to Tutsi individuals. A Hutu
diviner, in a short autobiography
transcribed in the early 1960's,
propheticallystates that they "shall have a
true Mwami and peace will reign and calm
will be restored" (Codere 1973:225).
Though his prophecy did not come true,
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the Hutu diviner identified that there was
a problem with the current state of affairs,
yet more revealinglyshows his faith in the
institution of the mwami. As will become
clear later, through various relationships
that are had between men in Rwandan
social structure, all are ultimately linked to
the king, even the Hutu. Lemarchand's
third theme in the "mythical axis" of
Rwandan culture, that of kinship, is
modelled largely on the hierarchy in the
political institution of the king. Here there
is also a high level of subordination to a
clearly defined lineage head, a living root
to which all in the agnatic descent line
may be traced.
These three myth themes provide
a moral and symbolic framework for the
economic and social structure from within
which Rwandan individuals could explore
possibilities to their advantage, despite
clear disadvantages to certain strata of
society. The divinely ordained castes, the
Tutsi monarchy, the rules of kinship, and
also the military and administrative
structures, all serve to divide Hutu and
Tutsi, from within as well as between the
two groups, yet also serve to tie them
together as a common culture.
Furthermore, in the buhake system
that will be detailed below, the castes are
inextricably linked together and to the
mwami, and this allows for individual
manipulation of possibilities and the
perpetuation of Rwandan culture.
Prior to analysis of the clientage,
or buhake agreement, it is important for
the purposes of an understanding of
Rwandan society to point out the
archaeological past of the Twa, Hutu and
Tutsi, set apart from the mythical origins
depicted by Tutsi myth. In fact a quite
different story is told, as archaeological
evidence suggests that the area that is now
Rwanda was first inhabited by Twa-
speaking hunters and gatherers, who
dominated the area until around A.D.
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1000. Hutu speakers then began to settle
in the area, setting up farms and a clan-
based system of monarchies that
dominated the Twa. Around the sixteenth
century, new immigrants from the Horn
of Mrica, the cattle-raising Tutsi, arrived
and set up their own monarchy in
Rwanda. (Robbins 1999:294)
As there was no great animosity
exhibited between the groups until the
mid-twentieth century with the rise of the
Rwandan intellectuals, and others who
perceived the Tutsi as being one side of
the same coin as German, then Belgian
colonizers. Codere's autobiographies of
Hutu men and women do not provide any
great evidence of hatred for the Tutsi
even at the point at which they
transcribed these, which was the early
1960's (1973).
Furthermore, though it is clear
that association with Tutsi was no longer
viewed as being beneficial for the meeting
of economic and socialneeds, many spoke
kindly of the buhake institution they
experienced as children through the toil of
their fathers. This makes a clear case for
the suggestion that conflict in Rwanda is a
result of relatively recent events that
resulted in the dysfunction of the
structure of society in this region.
Buhake, which comes from the
verb guhakwa, meaning to "pay one's
respects to a superior in his court"
(Maquet 1961:129),denotes the reciprocal
relationship between the shebuja, or lord,
and the garaug, or client. Both the client
and the patron were bound by socially
defmed rights and obligations, which of
course varied according to the situation.
The responsibilities of the patron to the
client included, but were not limited to,
support in lawsuits, food aid in times of
poverty, help with bridewealth payments,
and care of the garagu's widow and
children should he die (Maquet 1961).The
client in return provided personal service
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to the lord such as accompanying the
shebuja when he travelled, building or
repairing his home; if the client was Hutu,
this would also include working in the
fields or standing as an overnight guard
(Maquet 1961).Most notably, the patron
provided the Hutu client with cattle to
which onlyTutsi have ownership rights.
While it maybe tempting to abuse
these rights and obligations, this was
generally treated as a respectful and
important relationship.If one felt inclined
to be a "bad" shebrga one would get "the
reputation of being a bad shebuja [and]
people who were considering a buhake
agreement [would be] led to choose
another lord" (Maquet1961:134),and the
reverse situation applied as well for the
client. So there were clearlyguards against
abuses of buhake rights, as the fear of not
being able to enter into another buhake
agreement was great when this
relationship was, at the turn of the
century, a crucial relationship for the
success of both the client and the patron.
The transactional relationship between the
garagu and the shebrgawas a necessary one,
and the "freedom to enter into [a buhake]
agreement was socially illusory" (Maquet
1961:134), as the rich could not get by
without the labour of the poor, and the
wealth and power of the rich could be
tapped by these same labourers in return.
This alludes to what Jacques
Maquet identifiedas one of the significant
functional attributes of the buhake
agreement for the cohesion of Rwandan
society and for the survival of the
individuals this includes.
To live in a society where several
castes very unequal in their social power
coexist, frequently puts the individuals in
the weaker groups in a very difficult
position.
... To be protected
against [exacting]demand [made
on him by somebody possessing
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social power], it is indispensable
for the person submitted to it to
increase his own social power. It
is impossible to do this directly
as he cannot, except very rarely,
enter into the upper caste, but he
may obtain it directly by
succeeding in identifying himself
with a person endowed with
great social power. (Maquet
1961:136-137)
Maquet suggested that the clientage
institution is "the only means permitting
the protection of sociallyweak individuals
without destroying the unequal
participation of the groups in social
power" (1961:137). So the first function
of the buhake system was that of
protecting sociallyand economicallyweak,
namely the Hutu, by associating them
with the dominant caste that would seek
to abuse them.
This leads to another social function
played by the buhake system, which was
the maintenance of caste divisions
(Maquet 1961). Where the clientage
institution may offer protection to the
socially weak, it also ensures the
hegemony of Tutsi privileges and
maintains the status quo. By retaining
ownership of the cattle, the Tutsi may be
sure that the Hutu will remain in
economically disadvantaged positions. "By
granting only a precarious possession of
cattle to the clients, [this] left in the hands
of the Tutsi the ultimate control of cattle,
symbol of social prestige and instrument
of power [while]obtaining the advantages
of being provided with labour and
agricultural produce" (Maquet 1961:141).
The Tutsi have adopted what
"Oppenheimer calls the bee-keeper's
policy (as opposed to the bear's policy
who for the purpose of robbing the
beehive, destroys it), that is to say, to keep
the country's peasants in order
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permanently to exploit their productive
work" (Maquet 1961: 152). Thus the
buhake system at once can ensure the
reproduction of Rwandan culture by
providing the Tutsi with the material
wealth that symbolizestheir higher status,
and assures the precarious position of the
Hutu.
Another important function as
identified by Maquetwas the contribution
of the buhake institution to social cohesion
in Rwanda. The buhake system served to
diversify the subsistence goods to which
each caste would have access - the Hutu
would contribute agriculturalproduce and
Tutsi would make available to the Hutu
the cattle on which they had a monopoly
(Maquet 1961). Furthermore, besides the
economic dependence fostered by these
economic currents, "feudality proved a
very effective instrument for the
constitution of a culture common to all
Ruanda" (Maquet 1961: 138). Also,
through the buhake institution, Hutu are in
fact adopting some of the culture of the
Tutsi by making cattle an important
symbol of prestige and power in society.
Previously horticulturalists, Hutu are
adopting the "cattle complex" as a cultural
feature, and thus associating themselves
with the Tutsi. This is likewisethe case for
the Tutsi, who grew to see value in
agricultural produce, and began to see
their wealth measured by their access to
this as did the Hutu. This constant
exchange between the castes ensures
social cohesion, and is a functional aspect
of not only the buhake institution, but also
of the feudal structure such as it was in
Rwanda prior to colonization.
The buhake institution solves the
problem of feudalism, wherein a small
elite classmust dominate a more populous
majoritywithout completely disassociating
the inferior group with the means to
access socialpower. However, there is still
debate with regards to the integrative
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nature of the buhake institution. Catharine
Newbury criticizes how in studies of
Rwanda "ubuhake cattle clientship was
often described as performing such an
integrative role. . . . [and suggests] that
clientship does not necessarily promote
social integration; it can - and in Kinyaga~
a part of southern Rwanda,] it did
promote social cleavage" (1988:17).She
states further that "clientship in Rwanda
was not a static social "given"; it was a
dynamic phenomenon [and] forms of
clientship changed over time" (Newbury
1988:17). However, despite her
opposition, her views are entirely
analogous with those describedabove.
The buhake institution is a changing
social form, and it is a result of the
unequal distribution of rights within the
relationships between Tutsi pastoralists
and Hutu horticulturalists. Previously
reciprocal relationships which had served
to integrate these two groups in Rwanda,
as a result of the fact that "the direction of
change in clientship forms in Rwanda
tended to be unidirectional, toward less
reciprocity and more exploitation"
(Newbury 1988:17), became divisiveas a
result of outside manipulation of cultural
forms. Many recent studies have also
suggested that at the beginning of the
twentieth century, not all Hutu and Tutsi
were engaged in clientship agreements
(Claessen 1981:1981), and consequently
the importance of the buhake institution is
questionable. There is no conclusive
empirical data to this effect as any studies
in this area were limited in their
geographical scope, and though these are
the major criticisms that could be pointed
out of the ideas presented as yet, none
dispel the idea that the buhake systemwas
a solution to the problem of stratified
society.
The events that instigated the
dysfunction between Tutsi and Hutu
groups in Rwanda is a good example of
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the far-reachingeffects of colonization on
many regions of the world even today.
"When the Germans assumed control of
the area after the Berlin conference of
1884, they applied their racist ideology
and assumed that the generally taller,
lighter-skinned Tutsis were more
"natural" rulers, while the Hutus were
destined to serve them" (Robbins
1999:294). This increased the power of
the Tutsi minority to some degree, and
the division became one of ethnicity.
However, it was following the defeat of
Germany in World War I that Belgian
rulers exhibited the colonial tendency to
reorder existingsocialforms. This resulted
in the unequal distribution of power along
lines that had never before been
experienced in Rwanda, and the Tutsi
grew in power as the time passed as they
associated and became tied primarily to
Belgiancolonizers.
The Belgiansreplaced all Hutu chiefs
with Tutsis and issued identity cards that
noted ethnic identity, making the division
between Hutu and Tutsi far more rigid
than it had been before colonial control.
They also gave the Tutsi elite the
responsibility to collect taxes and
administer the justice system. The Tutsi
chiefs used this new power granted them
by Belgian rule to gain Hutu land
(Robbins 1999:294)
This essentially "reduced 'the
likelihood that the Hutu would think of
the Tutsi as protectors', moreover, the
incumbents were given a greatly
reinforced confidence in themselves, both
as chiefs and as representatives of a ruling
caste" (Lemarchand 1970:120).With this
was the fact that the Tutsi elite no longer
answered to the mwami, but to the Belgian
colonialists and their first obligation was
to the administration (Lemarchand 1970).
The Tutsi monopoly on social and
political power intensified the strain on
Hutu and Tutsi relations, and the Tutsi
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were soon perceived to be responsible for
the ills of the Hutu.
Forced labor was common, taxes
were increased, and the beating of
peasants by Belgian colonialists became
standard practice. Furthermore, the
colonial rulers transformed the economy,
requiring peasants to shift their activities
from subsistence or food crops to export
crops, such as coffee (Robbins 1999:294).
So, as the buhake relationships no
longer exists between Tutsi and Hutu, and
cultural exchange is no longer possible as
a result of the Tutsi association with the
colonialists, there occurs a dysfunction
between these two societies. When these
types of relationships lost all meaning, the
linkages between the Hutu and Tutsi also
ceased to exist. In 1954 the Mwami is
quoted: "The profound transformations
that have occurred in all walks of life have
necessarily had some perceptible
repercussions on the buhake, and in many
respects this institution has lost its
imperative and regulatory character"
(Lemarchand 1970:128). At this time a
strict regulatory framework was set up,
and new buhake cattle-contracts were
prohibited. So in this instance, the
abolition may be viewed as a cause and a
symptom of the dysfunction 01' Rwandan
culture. This trend would thus continue
until the late 1950's with "the rise of a
politically-conscious Hutu intellegentsia"
for the "launching and organisation of a
Hutu revolutionary force" that
"presupposed, specifically, the sundering
of vassalage ties at some points in the
social hierarchy, and an earnest desire on
the part of at least some Hutu peasants to
liquidate whatever links of dependency
still operated in the chain of vassalage"
(Lemarchand 1970:126).
The buhake institution in Rwanda was
both an expression of the relationship
between Tutsi and Hutu, and a means of
maintaining that relationship as well, so
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following Belgian colonization not only
would the disappearance of this institution
in Rwandan culture be a source of
tension, but it could also be perceived as a
symptom of that tension as well. The
cattle-contract in Rwandan culture was a
means for the marginalised to gain access
to social power, and it also ensured that
the wealthy retain that social power. So
the removal of this institution and the
subsequent conflict suggests the
functional nature of social structures, and
of how a dysfunction may occur when
these are distorted. This is an extremely
interesting case of how colonial forms
interfered with existing cultural structures,
and provides a case for the functional
nature of these cultural structures.
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